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THREE LARGE TRUCK CRASH CATEGORIES: 
WHAT THEY TELL US ABOUT CRASH CAUSATION 
 
Ronald R. Knipling 
Human Factors & Traffic Safety Consultant 
Arlington, Virginia, USA 
Email: tbsafety@aol.com 
 
Summary: Large Truck Crash Causation Study (LTCCS) data is used to compare 
three categories of crash involvements:  truck single-vehicle (SV) involvements, 
multi-vehicle (MV) involvements in which the truck has been assigned the critical 
reason (CR), and MV involvements in which the other vehicle (OV) has been 
assigned the CR. These three categories represent distinctly different causal 
contributions by truck drivers to the crash, with SV involvements having the 
greatest truck driver impairment and misbehavior. Surprisingly, paired 
comparisons of the three categories indicate that truck SV and truck-CR MV 
crash involvements were the most dissimilar in their causal profiles. Factors 
associated with truck SV crash involvements include non-use of safety belts, 
driver unfamiliarity with roadways, vehicle failures, lack of prior sleep, 16+ hours 
awake, and early morning driving. Dense traffic situations (e.g., rush hours) make 
trucks more likely to be at-fault in MV crashes. Many other factors were not 
associated with differences among the categories, suggesting no differential effect 
on truck driver safety performance, even though they might affect risk generally. 
Among fatigue-related factors, those related to sleep and alertness physiology 
were linked to SV crashes, while those related only to Hours-of-Service (HOS) 
work rules were not. 
 
OBJECTIVE & METHOD 
 
This “data mining” analysis employs statistics on crash causation, characteristics, conditions of 
occurrence, and associated factors from the LTCCS. The LTCCS (Starnes, 2006) employed in-
depth post hoc investigations and reconstructions of 963 large truck crashes involving 1,123 
trucks and 837 other vehicles. Crashes were selected based on a stratified sample of large truck 
crashes causing one or more fatalities or injuries. Cases were assigned weights to generate 
nationally representative statistical profiles in a manner similar to the General Estimates System. 
LTCCS data variables provide detailed descriptions of the physical events of each crash, along 
with extensive information about drivers, vehicles, locations, weather, and roadways. 
 
This paper re-examines data from an earlier LTCCS study (Knipling and Bocanegra, 2008), 
which primarily compared crashes involving Combination-Unit Trucks (CTs or tractor-
semitrailers) to those of Single-Unit Trucks (STs or straight trucks). The analysis examined 44 
variables relating to crash characteristics, conditions of occurrence, key causal variables, and 
associated factors. This paper focuses on a perspective that was secondary in the original work, 
but which actually provided more provocative findings; that is, comparisons among different 
crash categories. In this paper, LTCCS statistics are examined for three crash categories: 
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 Truck SV crash involvements. 
 MV crash involvements where the truck was assigned the CR (“at-fault”). 
 MV crash involvements where the OV was assigned the CR. 
 
These categories represent three distinctly different causal 
contributions by the truck driver (or truck). SV crashes 
occur due to loss of vehicle control, either resulting in a 
road departure, rollover, or jackknife. They often involve 
egregious unsafe driving acts, driver impairment, or vehicle 
failures (Knipling, 2009). Truck-CR MV crashes can be 
due to these same factors, but far more often they are due to driver information processing errors 
(e.g., looked but did not see) or errors in dynamic judgment (e.g., gap distances). OV-CR MV 
crashes represent a quasi- (or perhaps pseudo-) control condition where there was no truck driver 
critical error or other critical truck failure. OV drivers did make critical errors in these crashes, 
however, and comparisons of their errors to those of truck drivers reveal similarities as well as 
important differences. 
 
The original study found few important differences between CTs and STs in their crash causal 
profiles or other characteristics. Far more revealing were comparisons among the three crash 
categories presented here. Two general types of results are presented for the three categories: 
 
 Comparisons of CR profiles for all LTCCS crashes where a CR was assigned. 
 Comparisons of other characteristics, conditions of occurrence, and associated factors 
(for aggregated CT + ST crash involvements, representing ~98% of LTCCS trucks).      
 
RESULTS & DISCUSSION:  COMPARISONS OF CRASH CR PROFILES 
 
The LTCCS critical reason (CR) was the immediate reason, failure, or human error leading to 
the crash critical event, which was the vehicle action or event that made the crash unavoidable, 
or was the crash itself. In its publications (e.g., Starnes, 2006), FMCSA avoids the words “cause” 
and “fault.” Nevertheless, the CR may be considered the principal proximal cause or trigger of 
the crash, and drivers/vehicles assigned the CR would, overwhelmingly, be legally at-fault for 
their crashes. Moreover, because the LTCCS recorded no causes or reasons judged to be 
contributory, the CR is the sole documented cause of LTCCS crashes. Other factors are merely 
associated, even though users are likely to draw causal inferences from them, as when “driver 
fatigue” is coded as an associated factor. 
 
Table 1 presents the top ten CRs for each of the three crash categories, as well as their column 
percentages and top-ten ranks within each category. The 14 CRs shown encompass the top ten 
for each of the three categories and at least 96% of CRs assigned in each category. Driving too 
fast was the dominant CR for truck SV crashes, and high on the list for both categories of MV 
crashes as well. Two categories of recognition failure, inattention (encompassing several 
subcategories) and inadequate surveillance (“looked but did not see”), were dominant in MV 
crashes and significant in SV crashes as well. Asleep-at-the-wheel was the proximal cause of 
13% of truck SV crashes, 9% of OV-CR MV crashes, but only 1% of truck-CR MV crashes. 
Correcting for rounding error, OV drivers were eight times more likely to be asleep-at-the-wheel 
Principal Acronyms 
CR – Critical reason [≈ “at-fault”] 
SV – Single-vehicle  
MV – Multi-vehicle 
OV – Other vehicle. 
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than truck drivers in their MV crashes. Heart attacks and other physical impairments presented a 
similar picture, though the OV/truck ratio was less extreme, about 3:1.  
 
Table 1. Top critical reasons (CRs) for three categories of LTCCS truck crashes 





Too fast for conditions or curve/turn** 30% (1) 13% (3) 10% (4) 
Asleep-at-the-wheel 13% (2) 1% 9% (5) 
Vehicle failure (e.g., cargo shift, brakes, tires, suspension)*** 13% (3) 7% (6) 4% (10) 
Inattention (e.g., distraction, daydreaming)* 13% (4) 19% (1) 20% (1) 
Response execution error (e.g., overcompensation, poor control) 8% (5) 3% (10) 9% (6) 
Heart attack or other physical impairment 6% (6) 2% 6% (8) 
Inadequate surveillance (looked but did not see or didn’t look) 4% (7) 19% (2) 10% (2) 
Driver error, type unknown 4% (8) 4% (8) 10% (3) 
Aggressive driving behavior 2% (9) 0.5% 2% 
Environmental factor (e.g., slick roads, weather, roadway)**** 2% (10) 3% 3% 
Illegal maneuver 0.4% 8% (4) 7% (7) 
Following too closely to respond to unexpected actions 0.4% 8% (5) 1% 
Misjudgment of gap or other’s speed 0.2% 5% (7) 4% (9) 
False assumption of other road user actions 0.0% 3% (9) 2% 
Other miscellaneous CRs not shown 2% 4% 3% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Aggregations:  * Internal distraction, + external distraction, + other inattention (daydreaming), + unknown recognition error. ** 
Too fast for conditions to be able to respond to unexpected actions of other road users, + too fast for curve/turn. *** All vehicle 
factor CRs combined. **** All environmental CRs combined. Percentages are LTCCS estimates of all serious U.S. truck crashes.  
 
Table 1 demonstrates that truck SV and MV crashes result from largely different profiles of 
proximal causes. Truck SV crashes are dominated by speeding and catastrophic failures of the 
driver or vehicle, resulting in some form of vehicle control loss. Truck-CR MV crashes can be 
due to these CRs, but more often they are due to recognition failures or decision errors made in 
relation to other vehicles, such as a gap misjudgment or the “decision” to follow too closely. The 
fact of disparate CR profiles for truck SV and truck-CR MV crashes suggests that combining 
them into an “all truck-CR” category is “mixing apples and oranges,” and likely to mask 
underlying crash causal profiles and mechanisms. SV-MV crash differences may not be widely 
appreciated, but they are not surprising given that SV crashes involve a failure of vehicle control, 
whereas MV crashes reflect primarily a failure of response to traffic events (Knipling, 2009).    
 
The two MV CR profiles are similar. This is to be expected, since both reflect primarily vehicle 
interaction errors rather than loss of vehicle control. Some truck-OV differences are notable. 
Inadequate surveillance is more prominent for trucks (19%) than OVs (10%), probably because 
of blind zones and other visibility problems for trucks. Trucks also have more vehicle factors that 
can go wrong (7% vs. 4%). Trucks following OVs too closely represented a greater threat (8%) 
for LTCCS crashes than OVs following trucks (1%), probably because of truck brake limitations 
and the high forces resulting from truck impacts into smaller vehicles. 
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Of the three categories, one might expect the first (truck SV) and third (OV-CR MV) to be least 
similar, since they ostensibly share no common elements. They are different crash categories, 
and a different vehicle has the CR. In fact, the two most dissimilar categories are the first two, 
truck SV crashes and truck-CR MV crashes. This was demonstrated by two correlational 
comparison methods, as shown in Table 2. Both methods showed truck SV profiles to be more 
similar to OV-CR MV profiles than to truck-CR MV profiles. The two comparison methods 
differ as to which two profiles are most similar. 
 
Table 2. Dyad comparisons of the three categories using two correlation methods 
 
Correlation Method 
Trk SV × 
Trk-CR MV 
Trk SV × 
OV-CR MV 
Trk-CR MV × 
OV-CR MV 
Pearson r comparing all 34 possible specific CRs +0.18 +0.35 +0.66 
Spearman rho comparing ranks of 14 CRs in Table 1  +0.09 +0.58 +0.46 
 
Is there a plausible explanation for the above finding?  The finding can be understood in light of 
the fact that many serious truck-light vehicle crashes involve the same kinds of light vehicle 
driver unsafe driving acts and impairments seen in SV crashes. The statistics in Table 1 belie 
this. To the extent that OV-CR MV crashes are like SV crashes, they cannot be successfully 
addressed by public information messages like “Share the Road” and “Don’t Hang Out in the No 
Zone.”  For MV crashes involving light vehicle driver CRs but SV-like crash scenarios, the truck 
is merely the impact point for the errant light vehicle. Such crashes are better addressed by 
mainstream traffic safety (e.g., the “4 E’s” of engineering, education, enforcement, and 
emergency response) than by programs focusing on light vehicle-truck interaction, like “Share 
the Road.”  On the other hand, to the extent that OV-CR MV crashes do represent vehicle 
interaction errors like “cutting in,” such programs may have value, or at least a rationale. 
 
RESULTS & DISCUSSION:  COMPARISONS OF OTHER CHARACTERISTICS 
 
This section examines characteristics are associated with the three categories. Tables 3-6 
compare descriptions, conditions of occurrence, and other factors associated with the three 
categories, plus the baseline total for all truck involvements (the weighted average of the three). 
Each percentage is for the attribute within that variable, and coded in relation to the truck or 
truck driver. They are based on truck crash involvements rather than crashes. For example, in 
Table 3 truck crash involvements occurring between 4:01 and 7:00am were 11% of all CT+ST 
involvements, 24% of SV involvements, 4% of truck-CR MV involvements, and 8% of OV-CR 
MV involvements. Is there an explanation for the overinvolvement of these three hours in SV 
crashes?  These hours are within the lowest circadian valley of the 24-hour day for human 
performance (Rosekind, 2005; Knipling, 2009), and SV crashes are the category most reflective 
of driver performance failure. Hours-of-sleep and time awake are two other physiological 
parameters affecting performance, and show similar relative effects in Table 3. Not surprisingly, 
the variable “Driver Fatigue” is also similar, though it had a less objective basis for investigator 
coding than the other three variables cited. Looking down to Table 6, we see that not every 
reputed fatigue factor has such crash involvement patterns. Long hours of working and driving 
(within the legal limits at the time) have no consistent association with crash pattern. Many sleep 
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and safety researchers (e.g., Rosekind, 2005; Knipling, 2009) consider such non-physiologically-
based HOS work parameters to be only weakly related to crash risk and involvement. 













Hour-of-Day 4:01 to 7:00am 11% 24% 4% 8% 
Relation to Junction Entrance/exit ramp related 11% 22% 7% 7% 
Trafficway Flow Undivided (2-way w/ or w/o left turn 
lane) or one-way  42% 58% 37% 36% 
Posted Speed Limit 70 or 75mph 11% 16% 6% 8% 
Road Alignment Curve (Left + Right) 30% 60% 22% 19% 
Pre-Event Movement 
(Truck) 
Truck negotiating a curve 28% 46% 12% 9% 
Seat Belt [Non-] Use (by 
Truck Driver) 
None used or not indicated* 11% 23% 8% 6% 
Driver Roadway 
Familiarity  
Truck driver rarely/never drove 
road before* 26% 38% 29% 17% 
Vehicle Factor (Truck) Present (any inspection deficiency) 40% 62% 50% 21% 
Roadway Factor  Present (any deficiency) 20% 27% 21% 17% 
Driver Fatigue Truck driver fatigued* 13% 35% 17% 3% 
Hours of Last Sleep  < 6 hours last main sleep* 16% 29% 15% 10% 
Hours Since Last Sleep 16+ Hours (as % of 0 to 18+)* 3.4% 6.3% 3.5% 1.6% 
* % of knowns. Table 3-6 percentages are LTCCS estimates for all U.S. CTs + STs involved in serious crashes. 
Other comparisons seen in Table 3 demonstrate that a variety of factors contribute to crash 
causation. Safety belt non-use is not a driving behavior, but it is indicative of risk-related driver 
personality traits like lack of conscientiousness. It may also be linked to driver fatigue since 
obese drivers are at-risk for sleep apnea and also have low belt use rates (Knipling, 2009). Driver 
roadway unfamiliarity is a temporary driver state affecting attention to driving. Vehicle 
deficiencies may affect vehicle braking or other performance, and also may be correlated with 
other unsafe driver or carrier practices. Several roadway factors (e.g., curves) are seen to elevate 
SV crash risk. Note in Table 3 that some factors associated with truck SV crashes appear also to 
have weaker associations with truck-CR MV crashes compared to OV-CR MV crashes.  A 
newly-published LTCCS analysis report (Hallmark et al., 2009) corroborates many of the SV 
crash features shown in Table 3 and elsewhere in this paper. 
 
For truck-CR MV involvements (Table 4), the culprits are mostly those relating to driving in 
dense traffic, such as urban driving and rush hours. In Table 5, the sharpest overinvolvement of 
OV-CR MV crashes is seen in fatal crashes, the highest of three LTCCS severity levels. Looking 
at the severity statistics from another perspective (not shown in the tables), trucks were assigned 
the CR in 23% of their fatal (K) MV crash involvements, 37% of their incapacitating injury (A) 
MV crashes, and 46% of their non-incapacitating injury (B) MV crashes.  
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SV% MV Trk-CR% 
MV 
OV-CR% 
Hour-of-Day Rush hours 
(7:01 to 10:00am, 4:01 to 7:00pm) 31% 23% 44% 26% 
Relation to Junction Intersection 15% 9% 23% 14% 
Trafficway Functional 
Class 
Urban (6 different roadway types) 52% 38% 65% 53% 
Attempted Avoidance 
Maneuver 
Yes (braking, steering, and/or 
accelerating)* 62% 59% 64% 47% 
Traffic Factors Present 27% 6% 42% 31% 
* % of knowns. 








SV% MV Trk-CR% 
MV 
OV-CR% 
Crash Severity Fatal crash 9% 3% 6% 14% 
Hour-of-Day 7:01pm to 4:00am 16% 16% 13% 19% 
Light Condition Dark + dark but lighted 23% 25% 17% 25% 
 













Wet 16% 13% 16% 18% 
Construction Work Zone Present (in zone) 13% 3% 18% 17% 
Weather Factor Present (adverse weather) 14% 12% 15% 15% 
Hours Driving Since 8-Hr 
Break 
7-10 Hours driving 
(as % of 0 to 10) 11% 13% 10% 11% 
Hours On-Duty Since 8-
Hr Break 
10+ Hours on-duty 
(as % of 0 to 14+) 6.3% 6.9% 4.9% 6.6% 
Hours Worked Since 8-Hr 
Break 
10+ Hours working 
(as % of 0 to 14+) 6.7% 5.2% 8.1% 6.4% 
 
Table 6 presents factors generally without strong differential associations. A factor like “wet 
roads” may raise crash risk, but it does so almost uniformly across categories. LTCCS work zone 
percentages are far in excess of exposure to work zones, which is about 1% of driving (Knipling, 
2009). But they don’t suggest greater likelihood of fault for trucks compared to other vehicles in 
their MV crashes. Both MV percentages greatly exceed the SV percentage, however. 
 
Corresponding pairs of percentages in Tables 1 and 3-6 can be compared to generate relative risk 
ratios or odds ratios. For example, in Table 4 the relative risk of truck-CR in MV crashes during 
rush hours is simply 0.44/0.26 or 1.7. The same odds ratio would be (0.44/0.56)/(0.26/0.74) = 
2.2. Comparing one category to the other two categories combined (i.e., the rest of the dataset) 
requires more extensive calculations and knowledge of the percentage of each of the three 
categories. For Table 1 (truck crashes), the LTCCS percentages were SV (31%), MV Truck-CR 
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(34%), and MV OV-CR (35%). For Tables 3-6 (CT+ST involvements), the respective 
percentages were 27%, 29%, and 44%. For example, the relative risk ratio of “SV crash 
involvement, given non-belt use” was 3.5 and the corresponding odds ratio was 4.3 (calculations 
not shown). Such relative risk and odds ratios do not capture crash risk, however. Rather, they 
represent crash category risk, a big difference. Quantification of crash risk requires non-crash 
control or exposure data, which did not exist in the LTCCS. Perhaps future crash investigation 




The original project generating the data for this paper was funded by FMCSA and performed 
under a Virginia Tech Transportation Institute (VTTI) subcontract. Ralph Craft of FMCSA was 




Hallmark, S.L., Hsu, Y-Y, Maze, T., McDonald, T., and Fitzsimmons, E. (2009). Investigating 
Factors Contributing to Large Truck Crashes Using the FMCSA’s LTCCS Database. Center 
for Transportation Research and Education, Iowa State Univ., FMCSA report. 
Knipling, R.R. (2009). Safety for the Long Haul: Large Truck Crash Risk, Causation, & 
Prevention. Arlington, VA:  American Trucking Associations. 
Knipling, R.R. and Bocanegra, J. (2008). Comparison of Combination-Unit Truck and Single-
Unit Truck Statistics from the LTCCS. Washington, DC: FMCSA & Volpe Center. 
Rosekind, M.R. (2005). Managing Safety, Alertness and Performance through Federal Hours-
of-Service Regulations:  Opportunities and Challenges. Alertness Solutions. FMCSA 
rulemaking docket #FMCSA-2004-19608. 
Starnes, M. (2006) LTCCS:  An Initial Overview. NHTSA National Center for Statistics & 
Analysis, DOT HS 810 646, August 2006. 
